Economic prescriptions for developing the regulated industries by MacAvoy, Paul W.


ALFRED P. SLOAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT
ECONOMIC PRESCRIPTIONS FOR DEVELOPING
THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES
505 - 71
S'^'
Paul W. MacAvoy
Professor of Economics, SToan School of Management
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MASSACHUSETTS
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
50 MEMORIAL DRIVE
/[BRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS C

! J^:i 181971
DEWEY LI3RARV
.
ECONOMIC PRESCRIPTIONS FOR DEVELOPING
THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES*
505 - 71
Paul W. MacAvoy
Professor of Economics, STban School of Management
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
This is one of a series of papers on regulation in
the energy industries supported by the Brookings Institution
Program of Research in the Regulated Industries. I am
grateful to Brookings, and to the Ford Foundation for
supporting Brookings in this endeavor; also to William
Capron of Harvard University and Harvey McMains of American
Telephone and Telegraph Company for their wise counsel.
no. 60S- 71
RECEIVED
JAN 26 1971
M. I. T. LIBRAr^ :-;. !
The regulated local monopolies in gas, electricity and
telephone service have encountered "shortage" problems in the last
two or three years, and they have little chance of solving these
problems in the expected manner with large transfusions of new in-
vestment. The shortages have not been measured on any economic
standard, but if a quality index were used to deflate physical out-
put, then "quality output" would probably register at about the same
level now as three years ago in all three industries in the larger
population and industrial centers. Most evident, there have been
queues for new gas and telephone service in Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
and Illinois, and interruptions in peak- load electricity service in
four Eastern Seaboard states. These events have been no more than
symptomatic of capacity shortages in telephones, fuel inventory shor-
tages in gas, and both capacity and fuel shortages in electricity.
The queues in gas have been indicative of shortages of new field
reserves estimated to be in the range of 25 to 50 per cent of new
discoveries in the last five years; as the "short" inflows continue,
1
the inventory shortage now approaches 25 per cent. Delays in tele-
phone installations have been indicative of shortages in switching
capacity of 10 per cent or more of peak demands at least in a half-
dozen large states. The interruptions in electricity service have
Cf. P. W. MacAvoy "The Regulation- Induced Shortage of Natural Gas"
The Journal of Law and Economics XIV, #1 (1971), and Fortune Magazine
May 1970, page 266.
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Indicated shortages of fuel Inventories of as much as 50 per cent,
1
and of capacity of as much as 10 per cent.
There are economic policies for clearing markets that might
ease these problems, but the prospects for using them to achieve
complete solutions are slim indeed. The economic decision rules
for peak- load pricing -- in effect, setting prices which themselves
clear excess demand on the peak and deficient demand off the peak --
have withstood analytical criticism and have been applied with sig-
2
nlficant effect in Europe. They could be used here. Following
these arguments, prices could be increased for final services where
there is excess demard, and the higher final output prices then would
serve as the basis for higher bid prices for the scarce input re-
sources. This plan should work to clear fuel markets of excess de-
mands; in particular, elimination of Federal Power Commission ceiling
price regulation in gas field markets would allow competitive markets
for gas to act in this way, so as to both add to quantities of gas
f supplied and reduce those demanded. The market- clearing price in-
creases would be substantial; those in gas, under the most optimistic
conditions (assuming that there is never any holdover excess demand
from previous years), would be close to 100 per cent of last year's
3
tegulated price level. As a consequence, there would be substantial
1
Cf. Fortune Magazine . May 1970, page 70, where fuel inventories are
assessed to be half the "normal" levels on the East Coast, and capacity
peaking margins to be closer to 5 per cent than to 15 per cent. These
are crude estimates, at the best.
^ Cf. J.R. Nelson Marginal Cost Pricing in Practice (Prentice-Hall, 1968).
^ Cf. P.W. MacAvoy "The Regulation- Induced Shortage of Natural Gas"
op . cit .

income gains of producers and losses of consumers; but the plan
would work because it would bring forth substantial additional
(now extra-marginal) supplies within a year. There might be less
success from raising prices to relieve shortages resulting from
deficient capacity. As a matter of course, Consolidated Edison
In New York City could clear excess peak load electricity demand
by raising prices until consumers went away. There would be some
set of prices at which this would work, also. But the reasons for
consumers going away might not be "acceptable," particularly if
industries respond to rising electricity prices with work stoppages.
Here the effect on C24P and employment of wide swings in energy prices
would be so adverse that political decisions would probably have to
prevent these attempts to clear markets. The transfer of income
from the consumer to the Edison Company might be politically unac-
ceptable as well, unless there is some final output effect -- unless
producers' profits or quasi-rents are an additional Important stimulus
to new investment. There is no analytical reason for this to occur,
however, when the producing company is a regulated and protected
monopolist, so that the "supply response" rationale for enduring
the short term income effects of price increases is not compelling.
The long run economic decision rales center on making capacity
additions so as to increase output to the level at which prices equal
long run marginal costs. No one has estimated how much additional
Investment would be required to accomplish this. New capital outlay

for telephone switching and transmission will have to come to more
than $100 billion in the next 15 years with the present pricing
scheme, and outlays in the electricity industry for production at
present prices, but Just for generating equipment alone, will have
1
to be more than $400 billion between 1971 and the year 2,000. The
Investments in finding and developing new fuel resources will have to
2
exceed $300 billion. These outlays would only be a minor portion
of the costs of capacity to eliminate excess demand; increased use
of land, air and water resources around and in urban regions would
be required as well, and the costs of these resources have not been
entered into this accounting. These costs have not been included in
forecast capital and fuel expenditures because, in the absence of
we 11- functioning markets for the environment, consumers as a group
bear most of them. They are extraordinarily difficult to calculate
because of the absence of markets either to purchase those resources,
or to do away with the effects of industrial use of them; there is
certainty only that they are going to be large enough to have an
effect on political decisions.
The required "internalization" of these natural resource costs
by consumers puts great pressure on the national political leadership
not to solve excess demand problems. Governments now hear more and
Cf. P.W. MacAvoy Economic Strategy for Developing Nuclear Breeder
Reactors (M.I.T. Press, 1969).
2 Fortune Magazine , op . clt .

stronger objections of minority groups against the construction of
new generating plants by electricity companies, or new pipelines by
gas companies, and the nature of the response most often now is to
delay or disallow the investmeits
. The final result of rulings of
this nature can well turn out to be a state of permanent excess de-
mand. In economic terms, regulatory prohibitions against the use
of natural resources by energy and communications companies could
prevent the achievement of levels of investment required to clear
markets at marginal or average cost prices.
There is an alternative long run economic plan for relieving
excess demands. In face of prohibitions against the use of natural
resources, those making research and development plans could orient
new work towards innovations in resource-replacing capital equipment.
There are candidate projects for developing such types of equipment.
The promising avenue for research to follow is not towards finding
ways to estimate and charge the costs of land and water rights,
although this work is worthy even if it looks impractical at present,
but rather to find new technology in capital equipment that relieves
the demands for these resources.
The Promising But Unproven Technologies
The technology in the energy and communications industries would
seem to be little different now from that some years ago. This impres-
sion is not easy to substantiate. The best analyses of technology.

In the reports and papers of the national laboratories such as at
Oak Ridge and Los Alamos, and of the university-affiliated govern-
ment laboratories, are testimony to the need for precise description
in order to make new developments; but none generalizes on the ex-
tent of innovation in new equipment and systems in these industries.
The lack of review material Itself seems to be testimony, however,
to how very little new application of science there has been. On
the engineering measures of efficiency, there seems to have been
substantial progress, particularly from higher load factors or larger
scale for the single producing unit, resulting in productivity in-
creases of 3 per cent to 5 per cent each year. Cost reductions have
been captured by scale changes and reliability improvements, but
there have been few new commercial applications of engineering science.
On other dimensions there has been little progress; the techniques
used for energy conversion in both sound transmission and electricity
production are the same now as they were 50 years ago. These are
natural resource using, in the sense that there were alternative
techniques also available 50 years ago that, if used, would have re-
sulted in substantially greater capital Investment and less fuel, air,
and water utilization. The near future techniques will continue to
be the same resource using technologies, given that the plans for
expansion of the major companies in these Industries now are for
Cf. W.R. Hughes' chapter on electric power in Technological Change
in the Regulated Industries . W. Capron, editor (Brookings, 1971).

more of the same systems on a larger scale. Progress would have
been the development of new technology that, when put in operation,
cost no more in total outlay but much less in natural resources.
There are some development projects now operating at low levels
that could accomplish this. They differ greatly in the problems to
be solved -- some are in the behavior of materials at 4000 F or at
o
-450 F, while others have been encountered in the behavior of large
scale or complex systems. All have histories of promising first-
stage development results in one or two companies, but a lack of
commitment to second- stage test modules or prototypes, where the
commitment involved large financial outlays and inter-company co-
operation. There are four to be considered here. (1) the generating
of electricity by MHD (Magnetohydrodynamics) , a technique centering
o
on obtaining current from passing a gas at 4000 F through a magnetic
field, has had a long laboratory history and commitments of several
million dollars through the half- scale prototype stage. (2) elec-
tricity from the breeder reactor has been produced by plants beyond
the prototype stage and at the full-scale experiment stage, but only
in one very specific coolant technology receiving contract grants
from the Atomic Energy Commission. The breeder reactor is a steam
generator with a difference --a reactor that uses the "fast" or
unmoderated fission process to produce both heat energy and high pro-
ductivity plutonium at the same time. The development problems center
on maintaining dynamic control of the fission process -- controlling
.*•'=
random displacement of temperature from equilibrium so as to prevent
melting of the reactor core -- but there are problems as well of
systems development In the cooling medium that are critical for plant
economics. These latter problems differ for a helium-cooled system
from a liquid sodium- coo led system, and the A.E.C. has shewn Interest
in solving only the liquid sodium reactor's problems. (3) supercon-
ductivity Is a technique for obtaining electricity with less of cer-
tain natural resources, in this case resources not in generating but
in transmission of electricity. Development projects here seek to
deliver electricity without line loss over long distances on enclosed
o
rare-metal conduits at -450 F. They are stalled on funding and or-
ganizing a full-scale prototype. (4) the new technology in communi-
cations is capable of passing through three stages, and whether it
does is merely a matter of very extensive expenditures on development.
The initial stage is in the development of large scale systems com-
bining digital switching equipment and satellites efficiently. There
are many combinations in systems engineering that have to be tried
for efficiency and for compatibility with present systems. The second
stage is the integration of "narrow band" telephone with "broad band"
video to provide two-way 50 to 100 channel unified picture and voice
communications in every household. The third and farthest stage is
completion of technical developments that will extend the useable
electromagnetic spectrum for communication to the millimeter wavelengths.
At each stage there has to be extensive experimentation with configurations

of data networks, telephone networks, new digital switching centers,
and satellites. The experiments call for large numbers of different
prototypes which have yet to be undertaken and funded.
These technologies have promise in dimensions not measured five
years ago. Tl e MHD generator and the breeder reactor are expected
to produce electricity at costs comparable to those experienced in
new fossil fueled generators in the middle 1960*8. But this is with-
out taking account of the almost complete elimination of the social
costs of using the air and water resources around the producing plants
and the land resources devoted to mining fossil fuels. The MHD
generator expects to achieve a 50 per cent increase In thermal ef-
ficiency as a result of higher temperatures, and expects to operate
most efficiently in a closed cycle, with consequent significant re-
ductions in thermal water pollution and in air pollution. The gas-
cooled breeder also operates on a closed cycle, and it reduces de-
mands for enriched uranium, to the point that present stockpiles of
uranium mining and manufacturing residue ought to serve as the basic
"breeding" fuel supply for the rest of the century in this country.
The superconductivity development program is not as promising, since
the costs for replacement of present above-ground long distance trans-
mission lines with below- ground superconductivity lines will be sub-
stantial. But underground superconductivity transmission would re-
lease land for other uses, as underground gas transmission does at
the present time, and such transmission would also increase useful
.'««,! VH9"'..
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output of electricity from fuel and capital outputs by more than
10 per cent. The three-stage communications development program
would increase the productivity of bandwidth and telephone line
transmission. It is possible to plan for exponential 10 per cent
demand increases to the year 2,000 with present configurations of
bandwidth, energy and land resources devoted to vastly expanded
telephone, data and video home communications.
The Economics of Development
These technologies will require money, time and an economic
strategy to become effective. How should the development programs
be organized, and what are the sources and amounts of required ex-
penditures?
The answers so far have been provided by the electrical equip-
ment manufacturers, the Atomic Energy Commission, and Bell Laboratories.
They have provided the funds and done the work themselves. This state
of affairs raises more questions than it answers. Are these organiza-
tions the right size and do they have the maturation for making de-
cisions on the relative efficiency of alternative development projects?
Should the development of each of these new technologies become the
responsibility of Goverment, or industry consortia, or only of certain
private companies, on grounds that goals will be reached sooner, and
at lower costs?
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The answers are a matter of extensive research, and the infor-
mation required for this research has not been made available by
those now involved in development projects. The information required
is quite specific to the economics of parallel research. This econo-
mic analysis -- arriving at policies as firm as those on pricing des-
cribed above -- begins with assuming that there are numerous competing
projects each promising to develop these new technologies, and these
must be eliminated by sequential decisions so that, at the last stage
of development, the least cost project in each technology survives.
This requires m parallel projects at the initial stage, from which
m ^ 1 are chosen up to the last stage -- but only if cost estimates
improve at each stage. More precisely, two improvements are required.
First, the expected value E(c/c ,c ^, ) = c . . , where c is the final
n n+1 n+1
estimate of demonstration plant cost and c , c are estimates ofn n ' 1
this same cost but at successive earlier stages n and n+1. Second,
the squared errors of successive estimates must diminish, or
2 ^ . .2
1
E(c -c) — E(c -c) . The decision then is to choose first the
^ n+1
project with the lowest forecast costs, and second any other project
for which the "looking costs" are less than expected subsequent cost
reductions from being able to select the best from multiple projects
2
after one more stage.
Cf . T. Marshak, et al. Strategy for Research and Development
(Springer- Ver lag, 1967).
^ The "looking costs" are the costs of running that project one more
period. Cf. T. Marshak, o£. cit., page 245. This does not hold for
m>3 -- a "striking example of the ability of analysis to refute intuition."
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To make these dlclslons on the breeder reactor would require
the development companies to reveal recent changes in design study
estimates of the costs of developing breeder fuel and capital.
These changes, calculated in a roughly comparable way for different
coolant technologies in the first non-breeder round of development
in the 1950*8 and early 1960*8 have been made known after the fact.
They show clear cost savings from parallel research and development,
1
of up to five coolate f.ypes; now they have to be calculated a priori
for the breeder round of development. Then normative propositions
can be formulated on the efficient number of parallel breeder reactor
projects.
Even at this preliminary stage of economic analysis, however,
some propositions on the breeder and on other new technologies can
be anticipated. Orders of magnitude of costs, and the nature of re-
search, must imply that the work will have to be done by an organi-
zation larger than a producing industry. The costs of developing any
one of these new technologies will exceed more than one billion dol-
lars, even if only a single (non- parallel) project is undertaken.
The estimated costs of research and development for a liquid sodium-
cooled breeder reactor are now between $1.3 billion and $3.2 billion,
while those for a gas-cooled fast breeder reactor are between $1.0
and $2.8 billion. The optimal combination of parallel projects will
P.W. MacAvoy Economic Strategy for Developing Nuclear Breeder
Reactors
.
op . cit
. .
Appendix A.
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1
likely cost from $2.2 to $4.6 billion. Those for the other tech-
nologies extolled above may not be quite as large, although this
may be the case because it is still early in the history of making
cost estlaates on MHD or digital switching. Parallelism seems
promising in each technology. Thevre are numerous projects proposed
towards final construction of an economic demonstration plant in
each of the new technologies; the breeder technology may boast three,
the MHD technology two, and the digital switching- satellite combinaticn
more than either of these. The projects will realize substantial
changes in forecast costs and performance early (in the sense des-
cribed above), at least to the full-scale prototype, so that there
should be more than one project at least at the next few stages of
development. Given the many requirements and the necessity of para-
llel projects, no single company could carry on the optimal number
of projects in any one technology. There has to be a consortium of
buyers, producers, or governments because of (a) the large scale of
single projects, (b) the total cost savings likely to follow from
taking on more than a single project, (c) the necessity for non-market
decisions in the choice among duplicative projects of the final single
2
project.
1
P.W. MacAvoy Economic Strategy for Developing Nuclear Breeder
Reactors, opi cit .
.
page 47.
Marshak, in his discussion of a "decentralized" organization, re-
quires that the many approaches be compared at each stage by a single
decision maker. T. Marshak, 0£. cit .
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The only organization presenting itsel£ as such a consortium
at this time is the Federal Government. No other operates at such
a large scale in R6eD that it does not face the risk of default on
all its obligations if parallel approaches in a new technology de-
fault. The consortium-Government here could possibly operate as an
insuror and banker, by funding research to be carried out by private
companies; it might be capable, given the risk that internal politics
will protect projects, of making unbiased comparisons of costs at
each stage and then weeding out the higher cost approaches. The
best way of establishing this presumption is to compare the problems
of the Government with those of alternative consortia.
The electricity or gas retailing industries, as a consortium,
could form a collection of sub- organizations to do research and de-
velopment. But would the consortium managers likely choose the op-
timal research path? Capital markets are not now perfect enough to
provide them with funds to do enough research --at least net enough
relative to the Government consortium with its balanced portfolio of
many other R+D projects. Also, they would not organize correctly.
Since individual demands for new technology by the retailers would
differ over a wide range -- depending on buyer's scale and the prices
of fuels at his location -- an averaging process would have to be
applied to all demands. The weighting in the consortium would pro-
bably have to account for large numbers of small firms, so that the
"average buyer's demand" for new technology would call for a smaller
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scale than warranted by new "largest buyers' demands." The second
demand would not be chosen, even though offering lower unit costs
for the final consumer, in costs of natural or other resources.
Rather than the new technology changing market structure, it would
be fitted to the prevailing market structure. This consortium might
choose a costlier approach for the good of members, as well, where
this approach promised higher costs of those factors on which a
1
"regulated rate of return" could be made. Even though more capital
and less natural resources can be called for from the new technology,
the prejudice of the buyer in favor of "return- earning" capital does
not guarantee that this consortium achieves the right balance. There
is considerable doubt that the companies on the buying side of markets
for energy equipment could as a group decide the least-cost staging
of multiple approaches to new technology in this industry.
The producers of equi^ent themselves could form a consortium
to carry on research. Here the motivation for cost reductions would
be strong, and the scale of research would at least be in keeping with
the large scale of the firms on the producing side of these industries.
There would be serious problems, however. Given that each coapany
would specialize in a project, the "weeding-out" of projects would
reqviire that some companies fail to complete their programs. In effect,
the consortium would be required to fail its members and such decisions
Cf. P.W. MacAvoy Economic Strategy for Developing Nuclear Breeder
Reactors . op . cit . . Chapter 3.
d1 ^
'"i&j^ >'•','.
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would be more or less difficult to make, depending on the way in
which the organization was structured. The decisions might well
depend upon being able to make side pa>inents to failed firms, and
these payments would raise other serious problems. The existence
of an industry-wide organization to control research output and
render side payments to member firms makes collusion on final pro-
duction of new equipment possible, and even probable. The economy-
wide losses from collusive prices can be greater than the gains
from following the consortium's efficient research plan; in the
case of developing breeder reactors, these losses appear to be half
of the total gains from the breeder and substantially greater than
1
the savings from eliminating duplicative research. In any event,
the (alternative) Government consortium would not present the problems
inherent in research collusion among producers.
The exception is perhaps the telephone industry. With the
retail telephone companies organized into the "American Telephone
and Telegraph Consortium" covering most of the industry, there is a
strong decision maker with coverage comprehensive enough to assess
the various system development projects in Bell Laboratories, The
Western Electric Company, and operating companies throughout the
country. The scale of projects, given AT€eT'8 access to the broadest
non- governmental capital sources, is likely to be close to that of
Cf. P.W. MacAvoy Economic Strategy for Developing Nuclear Breeder
Reactors , op . cit . . Chapter 4.
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the Government consortium Itself. The Integration of development
Into a single company providing the final equipment does not create
the "collusion p'-oblem" if the regulatory agencies control the ill-
effects from a single source of supply in this industry. There is
some basis for constructing "m" approaches to digital switching
configurations within the jurisdiction of Bell Laboratories, for
example, and expecting internal cost reviews to lead to reductions
in this number until the least- cost approach remains at the last
stage. There are still problems, however. The choice of projects
may be influenced by regulation on the basis of return on capital;
even if, once again, the overemphasis on capital is appropriate,
there Is no way to tell when it is excessive. Also, the choice of
projects may be influenced by whether the development work is done
within AT&T or outside, with those done inside favored because they
add to costs providing a regulated retura. Given that much of the
Government- sponsored research on satellite technology is both well
ahead of and outside of AT&T, the location of the "producers' con-
sortium" within AT&T might result in too little new space technology
and too much new earth technology.
The proper organization depends centrally on costs, and on the
importance of parallelism in development. More than one approach
most likely will be shown to be optimal for cost or demand reasons
for the next few years, in each of the technologies mentioned. One
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company probably cannot afford to complete the new technology.
This seems most probable, in the energy Industries at least; but
it is still a bit early to assert that the electricity and gas com-
panies ought not to do any research and development. It is only
likely that the Governnent could and should do it, probably by
funding a number of company ventures in competing projects in any
one technology and then choosing the best of these.
Even here, the proposition as to best organization is not firm
and precise, since the "Federal Government" includes The Federal Power
Commission, The Atomic Energy Commission, The Federal Communications
Conraission, and the various Power Administrations in the Department
of the Interior, each with its own constituency. None of these is
the Institution for efficient R+D. If the Atomic Energy Commission
were to choose projects, given its constituency in the steam boiler
industry, little work would be done on superconductivity and even
less on digital switching or satellites. The Federal Power Commis-
sion's long experience with controlling entry and prices in the gas
transmission industry would not prepare it well for choosing among
reactor development schemes. The best organization for making R+D
decisions would be versed in science, and would be located in the
The argument made for parallel research in the study of the breeder
reactor was that a portfolio of projects would produce a variety of
products, all of which would be demanded at levels justifying the
additional expenditures. There were not enough data to evaluate
"pure parallelism" on one specific output.

19
Government so as to be able to make comparisons on the Bse of re-
sources across technologies without answering only to one consti-
tuency In one technology. The organization should have responsi-
bility £or all R+D expenditures on energy and communications
technology. If the assertions made here are correct on what has
to be done to eliminate excess demand in energy and communications,
and those on the scale of R+D are also correct, then the Executive
Office of the President could and should form this organization
very soon.
^nv \ \


